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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore whether official inquiries are an effective method for
holding the medical profession to account for failings in the quality and safety of care.
Design/methodology/approach – Through a review of the theoretical literature on professions and
documentary analysis of key public inquiry documents and reports in the UK National Health Service (NHS)
the authors examine how the misconduct of doctors can be understood using the metaphor of professional
wrongdoing as a product of bad apples, bad barrels or bad cellars.
Findings – The wrongdoing literature tends to present an uncritical assumption of increasing sophistication
in analysis, as the focus moves from bad apples (individuals) to bad barrels (organisations) and more latterly
to bad cellars (the wider system). This evolution in thinking about wrongdoing is also visible in public
inquiries, as analysis and recommendations increasingly tend to emphasise cultural and systematic issues.
Yet, while organisational and systemic factors are undoubtedly important, there is a need to keep in sight the
role of individuals, for two key reasons. First, there is growing evidence that a small number of doctors may
be disproportionately responsible for large numbers of complaints and concerns. Second, there is a risk that
the role of individual professionals in drawing attention to wrongdoing is being neglected.
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Introduction: professional failures in medicine
Notwithstanding sustained critique (Dingwall and Lewis, 1983; Andrew, 2010) “the
professions” remain an enduring and important part of the institutional landscape in
modern societies (Noordegraaf, 2012). In most jurisdictions, they are seen as playing an
important role in setting standards, rooting out poor practice and disciplining those who
transgress against professional (and sometimes legal) norms, and nowhere is this more
evident than in medicine (Burau et al., 2009). A defining feature is the claim made for
self-regulation. But professions such as medicine sit embedded in wider institutional
assemblages, and it is pertinent to ask how are the professions themselves (as institutional
arrangements) held to account for this oversight and disciplining role?
Several high-profile scandals involving doctors (and by implication the medical profession)
have occurred in the UK over recent decades, and these mirror those found in many other
health systems (Lens and Van derWal, 1997; Braithwaite et al., 2015). The most recent of these
(at the time of writing in 2018) is the case of Dr Jane Barton at GosportWarMemorial Hospital,
implicated in the premature deaths of over 450 patients through the over-administration of
opiate drugs (Gosport Independent Panel, 2018). This followed the previous year’s major story
on Ian Paterson (Walshe and Chambers, 2017), a consultant breast surgeon who in 2017 was
jailed for 20 years for “wounding with intent” (he invented or exaggerated cancer risks, and
over 500 women underwent unnecessary surgery in private and public hospitals with
significant iatrogenic harm). Other notable scandals involving doctors in the National Health
Service (NHS) include: the case of Harold Shipman, a general practitioner who killed about 250
patients between 1972 and 1998 (Smith, 2004); the clinical incompetence of two paediatric
cardiac surgeons resulting in the deaths of up to 35 children at Bristol Royal Infirmary
(The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 2001); and between 400 and 1,200 patients dying as a
result of poor hospital care in Stafford in 2005–2009 (Francis, 2013). Scandals involving
doctors (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011), up to and including criminal behaviour (Chamberlain,
2017), are an enduring problem.
In medicine, the day-to-day management of individual miscreants is generally left to their
employer or, as a last resort, the professional regulatory and/or disciplinary process. However,
wider institutional responses to serious (or widespread) cases of poor care or outright
misconduct, especially those that are poorly addressed and/or publicly visible, sometimes
include a formal inquiry (Walshe and Higgins, 2002; Walshe, 2003). Indeed, the growing number
of such inquiries has been said to suggest dissatisfaction with existing forms of regulation
(Goodwin, 2018). A common finding from such public inquiries into medical scandals is that
many professionals, often including senior doctors, were aware of the poor care or misconduct,
but for one reason or another did not act in effective ways (if, indeed, they acted at all). Moreover,
even when staff did raise concerns – informally or formally, perhaps even “blowing the whistle”
to outside authorities – they were often either ignored or responded to inappropriately by their
host organisation and/or other agencies in the system (Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu, 2010).
In this paper, we develop a multi-level analysis of poor practice and misconduct
involving doctors in the UK. Drawing loosely on the analytical framework developed by
Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) and extended by Muzio et al. (2016), we explore how problems
(and solutions) in managing professional failings in healthcare can arise at three levels.
First, problems can arise at the level of the individual doctor, where personal
shortcomings – from incompetence to criminality – are seen as examples of “bad apple”
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professionals. Second, the organisational setting can be diagnosed as inimical to good
practice, with the usual invocation of “culture” as the culprit (“bad barrels”, to continue the
metaphor). Third, the overall health system can be implicated, identifying failings in
various constituent parts, and the relationships and coordination between them, as well as
in the overarching policy framings and directives (a case of “bad cellars”). In addition, we
contend (see later) that the overall nurturing of professional attitudes and practices
through initial professional education and training, as well as through subsequent
post-qualification specialisation and extra-organisational enculturation, extend the
metaphor: these professional processes can be seen as creating an “orchard” where new
professionals are “grown”, perhaps even in ways that make professional failings
(and institutional failure to tackle these failings) more likely.
These levels are, of course, connected: the overall system-level arrangements condition
and inform the organisational and professional context, and these in turn shape and
constrain individual behaviours. At the same time, tacit knowledge and patterns of practice
in clinical communities accrete and solidify to inform higher-level assessments about
acceptable norms. That is, new institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) can form and
solidify at multiple levels, being given additional weight when adopted by parts of the
formal professional architecture.
In seminal work from nearly thirty years ago, Donald Light articulated the concept of
“countervailing power”, the dynamics that ensure when “one party has accumulated such
power that it prompts other parties to muster their forces and attempt to control the first”
(Light, 1991). While such deliberative attempts to reassert control are important, we can also
see that power, its consolidation and its expression, may be impacted less directly and less
deliberately – as by-products or unintended consequences of other changes, for example.
Thus, it is important to see that these wider dynamics have the potential to exacerbate
existing risks and to create new vulnerabilities, such that the protective arrangements
against wrongdoing require constant attention (e.g. Muzio et al., 2016). Public inquiries into
professional failings can thus be seen as having an important role (both instrumental and
symbolic) in promoting or restraining the formation and/or embedding of new institutional
logics, and supporting (or impeding) the reform of regulatory processes, with consequences
for the restraint, surfacing and addressing of future professional failings.
Our focus then, in this analysis, is on exploring whether and how the medical profession
itself is being held to account and encouraged towards appropriate reform as a consequence
of public inquiries into individual professional failings or wrongdoing. Such dynamics are
complex and problematic because the self-regulatory nature of the profession contains
within it the logic that the professional should not only hold individual doctors to account,
but should also hold itself to account for its regulatory processes (so-called “new
professionalism” Evetts, 2009; Noordegraaf, 2012). And yet the profession is not immune
from broader influence and even statutory control, so it is reasonable to explore how such
influence is expressed and asserted.
We begin by exploring the (publicly financed and often publicly owned) health system
within which the overwhelming majority of UK doctors work, the NHS, and outline the
complex institutional arrangements for ensuring safe, high-quality care. From this we can
identify the crucial role played by “stories from the front-line” – from staff, patients and
relatives – in surfacing concerns, failures and misconduct. However, we also note the systemic
features that attenuate or block such accounts, including professional solidarity and anxieties
over repercussions. This leads us to explore the various ways that the professions – especially
the medical profession – have evolved historically, and how they have been construed
sociologically, as a means of beginning to examine the challenges of gaining clear sight on the
reform needs of professional oversight. Finally, we explore – from an empirical documentary
review – the relative failure of formal inquiries to address the wider needs of system change if
Healthcare
scandals
parts of the “cellar” (and, indeed, the “orchard”) are to see the reform that they need.
Specifically, we highlight the need for the medical profession itself to become better equipped
at dealing with the individual wrongdoing for which new dynamics have emerged.
The NHS health system (a hallowed cellar?)
Established in 1948, the NHS is one of the largest and most complex organisations in the
world, employing over 1.4 million full-time equivalent staff, including more than 150,000
hospital doctors and 40,000 general practitioners. In England, the NHS is formally accountable
to parliament through the Secretary of State for Health (other jurisdictions in the UK have
their own arrangements under devolved settlements). In terms of structure, the NHS is
made up of a complex “hierarchy and network” of sub-organisations, each legally a separate
employer, and each with different responsibilities and varied inter-organisational contractual
and reporting arrangements. In addition, a plethora of regulatory and oversight agencies exist
to assess and ensure high-quality care, with many reforms and structural reorganisations of
these agencies over recent decades. Alongside these statutory and delivery organisations sit
the professional bodies, with diverse arrangements for doctors, nurses, midwives and allied
health professionals. For doctors specifically, organisation, oversight and promotion of their
professional roles is arranged through three main strands: there are various “Royal Colleges”
(RCs); (arranged by specialty and sub-specialty, focussing on post-qualification education and
accreditation); there is the General Medical Council (GMC); (setting standards, especially
around education and initial qualification; arranging registration and licensing; and dealing
with concerns about malpractice); and there is the British Medical Association (BMA);
(an advocacy organisation for the profession, essentially “the doctors” Trade Union’).
Since its inception, the NHS has been the subject of successive waves of structural
reorganisation and reform. Traditionally dominated by medical professionalism (Dixon-Woods
et al., 2011), the NHS has, from the 1980s onwards, been subject to more extensive managerial
control and marketised restructuring as part of wider New Public Management trends
(Exworthy et al., 2016). These include such changes as the reform of professional regulation
and oversight, including more extensive methods of measuring and assessing organisational
and individual performance, and the use of financial incentives to drive performance
improvements. This has led to a range of market, corporate and professional logics being
accommodated, blended and contested at the local organisational level (Currie and
Spyridonidis, 2016; McDonald et al., 2013,) and claims that the medical profession is in flux,
being systematically de-professionalised, proletarianised and restratified (Ritzer and Walcak,
1988; McKinlay, 1982; Waring, 2014 and see expanded discussion below).
But the bare bones of this account do not convey the almost hallowed role that the NHS
plays in the UK national psyche (e.g. the prominence of the NHS in the opening ceremony of
the 2012 London Olympics showcasing the UK to the world). This hallowed role has
enormous contextual significance when seeking to understand the dynamics of professional
failings and the hesitant steps towards professional reform. Notwithstanding periodic and
very public crises around failings, the NHS remains the most trusted of British institutions
(British Social Attitudes Survey, 2016), and doctors remain the most trusted of professions.
Indeed, the NHS retains huge public support and politicians of all ideologies struggle to
manage its reform, despite its evident social and economic importance and despite much
evidence of the need for that reform (Exworthy et al., 2016).
Curiously, while doctors remain most trusted, and most influential in directing or
resisting reforms, they have always remained a little outside of (or semi-detached from) the
organisations that make up the NHS. From its inception in 1948, doctors had to be coerced/
bribed into the new structure (Bevan’s infamous quote that he “stuffed their mouths with
gold” Klein, 2013), and even now most family doctors (GPs) remain as independent
contractors, not salaried employees of the NHS. More recent work on the relations between
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doctors and managers in hospitals (Powell and Davies, 2016) suggests that there is an
increasing gulf between doctors and the managerial structures that oversee them, and that
even where good relations exist there are fragilities that can prompt disengagement.
Surfacing professional errors and wrongdoing ( finding bad apples)
Professional work often requires judgement based on hard-to-codify knowledge, alongside
skills and expertise that may be imperfectly expressed, in situations of risk and uncertainty.
Moreover, the professions themselves may resist codification as a bulwark against
de-professionalisation (Timmermans and Berg, 1997). It is no surprise then that identifying
professional errors and wrongdoing is difficult and fraught with ambiguity. One influential
categorisation of transgressions identifies “slips”, “lapses”, “mistakes” and “violations”,
each of which involves differing degrees of culpability (Reason, 2000). The situation is
further complicated as rules-based policies, procedures and standards have become
commonplace: “workarounds” may be required to deal with anomalies or contradictions
between policies, or even just to ensure smooth workflow (Debono et al., 2012). This
introduces the challenge of judging appropriate and judicious violations from unnecessary
transgressions, calling into question not just actions and competencies, but also motives.
Many opportunities to raise issues about quality or safety occur quite routinely and are
deeply embedded in clinical work; and diverse informal strategies of correction are often
effective (Tarrant et al., 2017). Yet “calling out” errors and wrongdoing remains a risky
business, especially in professionalised and hierarchical organisations, where power is
never far from the surface (Currie et al., 2012; Waring, 2014). Indeed, the questioning of a
fellow doctor’s skill or judgement has, until recently, been explicitly proscribed in
professional codes of conduct as itself an example of misconduct.
Unsurprisingly then, national staff surveys suggest widespread disquiet about raising
concerns about poor or unsafe patient care in the NHS (NHS National Staff Survey, 2015/
2016). There is a perception among health professionals that they may be ostracised, bullied,
or put their careers at risk if they were to raise concerns about colleagues (MPS, 2012). The
reality of “working for the NHS” means that raising concerns or “blowing the whistle” on
professional misconduct in any one NHS organisation risks not only professional ostracism
and local organisational retaliation, but also an effective “blacklisting” from employment
elsewhere in the service. Despite some expansion in private healthcare, the NHS remains the
major employer for most healthcare professionals, so being excluded from the NHS almost
amounts to being excluded from employment, at least within the UK. A related point is that
in an NHS densely linked by formal and informal networks, staff may have concerns about
their ability to find adequate confidential support and guidance, with some former
whistleblowers recalling being shocked at how little support they received from professional
bodies, regulators or even trades unions (Francis, 2013).
Taken together then, there are powerful reasons for professionals not seeing, believing or
acting upon evidence of wrongdoing amongst their peers; and there are significant
impediments to others doing so. Managers and nurses, for example, may lack the knowledge
and status to query doctors’ behaviour, and may themselves suffer from similar risks to
their organisational and professional life as doctors; patients, relatives and carers may be
impeded through lack of specialist knowledge, confidence or power.
Whatever these challenges, finding – and dealing effectively with – “bad apples” is
especially important as evidence grows that small numbers of professionals may be
disproportionately responsible for large numbers of complaints and concerns (Bismark
et al., 2013). As a result, the internal workings of the profession – and in particular, its
capacity to support and protect those at the frontline who do observe and report potential
problems – becomes paramount, as does an examination of the mechanisms – such as
inquiries – that can be used to shape these arrangements.
Healthcare
scandals
The medical profession (both barrel and orchard?)
The structures underpinning the profession of medicine in the UK date back to the
nineteenth century. The Provincial Medical and Surgical Society was formed in 1832,
becoming the BMA in 1855, which continues to this day. However, political pressure for
reform eventually culminated in the 1858 Medical Act, which marks the modern period of
medical professionalism in the UK. The Act created what eventually became the GMC and
entered medicine into a regulatory agreement with the state.
Doctors receive much of their socialisation and collegial etiquette through their
professional training and engagements rather than as a consequence of their organisational
setting (Becker et al., 1961; McDonald, 2014). Moreover, in the UK certainly, doctors – even
more so than other professional elites such as law and journalism – are drawn
disproportionately from the more advantaged strata of society: just 4 per cent of UK doctors
come from working class backgrounds, and 80 per cent of UK medical school applicants come
from around only 20 per cent of all schools, predominantly independent (i.e. fee-paying) or
grammar schools (Social Mobility Commission, 2016). It hardly needs saying of course that
despite any NHS and/or organisational ambivalence noted earlier, the medical profession has
succeeded in extracting consistently high societal rents (Klein, 2013).
The various branches of the medical profession noted above (the RCs, the GMC and the
BMA) provide collective control over education, standards and licensure, and important
venues for occupational socialisation and the encouragement of professional collegiality
(Aveling et al., 2016). Through registration with the GMC, the profession has (since the
mid-nineteenth century) possessed an occupational monopoly (and hence powerful incentives
for individual doctors to be appropriately socialised), with “registration” required with the
GMC for any doctor to practice in the UK. The self-regulatory “collegial model” also creates a
fiduciary responsibility to patients and the general public with the profession as a whole
acting as guarantor for the performance and conduct of each of its members.
From its beginning, the Council had the power to remove individuals from the register as a
penalty for “serious professional misconduct”, though such cases were usually sexual in
nature and until the 1980s the Council took a very narrow view of its role, being generally
reluctant to pursue allegations of professional incompetence. As a result, serious and culpable
behaviour, including clinical incompetence, sexual wrongdoing and even deliberate patient
harm were known to have occurred, often unchecked. Even after significant reforms in the
1990s, referring to “a new professionalism […] fundamentally different from the past” (Irvine,
2001), a recent review of GMC activity (2005–2015) showed that “no doctor was barred from
practising medicine for serious violent and sex offences, including rape […] manslaughter and
domestic violence” (Chamberlain, 2017). As Dixon-Woods et al. (2011) argue, “unravelling the
puzzle of why the profession did not act to deal with individuals who posed such a serious
threat to its own legitimacy requires recognising that the system imperative to engage in
monitoring and correction of deviant behaviour was in conflict with the social imperatives for
collegial cooperation”. If, as the old adage has it, “the apple rarely falls far from the tree”, then
the custodians of the orchard may have been persuaded that socialisation processes alone
would be sufficient to minimise misconduct.
Theorising the profession
Since the late 1950s, several conceptual approaches to the professions can be discerned, with
the medical profession often being the example of choice for sociological theorising. The first
systematic study viewed the professions as central to the smooth functioning and stability
of modern societies (Parsons, 1951). From this perspective, the professions are assumed
to exercise an important benign social role by virtue of their esoteric knowledge and
expertise that are used for the benefit of society. Nevertheless, this “functionalist” approach
acknowledges that the medical profession’s tacit knowledge and technical expertise opens up
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the potential for abuse. To prevent this, and in return for being granted an elevated social
position, autonomy, high financial rewards and legal protection, the profession is expected to
submerge its self-interest and enter into an implicit social contract which ensures that their
privileged position is used for the benefit of society.
From the late 1960s, growing dissatisfaction with functionalist explanations gave way
to more critical perspectives. The emerging “power perspective” emphasised the role of
professional self-interest rather than selfless altruism, and sought to explicate the political
and social processes by which the professions attain and maintain their privileged
position in society (Larson, 1977). Here the professions are seen to rely upon their asserted
ethical standards in order to justify self-regulation and to defend their territory. Yet, as
Freidson (1970) notes, the medical profession may deceive others (and themselves) into
believing that they are acting in the public and client interest, while abusing their
authority for collective and individual gain.
Notions of misconduct and wrongdoing are central to both the functionalist and the
power perspectives on the professions. In the functionalist view, professional codes simply
preclude misconduct, with such behaviours being both deviant and aberrant. When
misconduct does arise, it is blamed on the behaviour of “bad apples” or rogue individuals
who violate the norms and moral code of their profession (Muzio et al., 2016). In the power
perspective, the professions are not assumed to have any special moral commitment to the
public good and are viewed more as self-organising cabals that use their institutionalised
protection from competitive forces to engage in self-serving behaviour. Medical misconduct
in this sense is consistent with a “bad barrel” hypothesis (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Muzio et
al., 2016) as it arises from the way in which the medical profession is organised; but these
arrangements are embedded in a wider socio-political context and so there are also elements
of the “bad cellar” hypothesis. Moreover, dynamic shifts in these arrangements may expose
new vulnerabilities or exacerbate existing ones (Muzio et al., 2016). For example, new
financial or reputational incentives may change clinical behaviour in unexpected and
unwarranted ways: the extension of clinical performance measurement systems has
undoubtedly incentivised a range of dysfunctional behaviours, for example (Mannion and
Braithwaite, 2012). Indeed, any shift in the organisational and regulatory environment may
give rise to a wide array of unintended consequences, and so provide scope for new forms of
failure and wrongdoing.
While the power perspective continues to be influential, its core argument – that the
medical profession is a self-interested cabal – has attracted considerable critique. One line
of argument suggests that the powers of the medical profession are constantly being
eroded, a process known as proletarianisation. This thesis highlights the potential for
expert work, including medical work, to be subject to the codification and standardisation
that allows more bureaucratic control in the name of controlling costs and minimising
risks (Timmermans and Berg, 1997). A second line of argument, linked to some of these
trends (known as the deprofessionalisation thesis), focusses on the fact that attitudes to
traditional forms of authority are changing. In particular, it notes a decline in the public
trust of public institutions (Noordegraaf, 2012), with the public increasingly expecting
their public services – including healthcare – to operate in transparent and accountable
ways. These arguments combined raise serious questions about the validity of viewing
the medical professions as simply an effective exercise in economic self-interest – other
forces are at work that constrain and direct professional work to broader ends.
A third challenge is that – rather than undergoing a period of decline as supposed by the
proletarianisation and deprofessionalisation theses – medicine is instead experiencing a
process of “restratification” that is sustaining medical privilege and power, albeit in smaller
and tighter groupings. This argument asserts that the medical profession is becoming (re-)
stratified into distinct “elite” and “rank and file” roles, with differential power, rewards,
Healthcare
scandals
prospects and status (Noordegraaf, 2012). In this way, medical elites increasingly subject
“ordinary” practitioners to greater peer surveillance and control as they seek to maintain
collective regulatory privileges, albeit in a new and more transparent form.
In this complex and changing context, it has been argued that a more dynamic approach
to professional misconduct is needed: an ecological perspective (Abbott 1998, 2005),
consistent with a “bad cellars” metaphor, in which misconduct is understood in the
fast-changing political and economic contexts that are morphing the traditional institutional
arrangements of the medical professions and that are impacting on their powers to promote
and regulate appropriate professional behaviour (Muzio et al., 2016). Here the medical
profession is conceived as part of a broader ecology with adjacent institutions – reflecting
that the medical profession is constrained, supported and generally affected by the moves of
social actors adjacent to them and with whom they regularly interact (what Abbott, 2005
refers to as “linked ecologies”). In this context, professional misconduct (and also,
potentially, its surfacing and its remedy) is seen to arise from the re-drawing of boundaries
and relationships within and between professional ecologies (e.g. between doctors and
nurses, and between doctors and managers). A particular concern is that boundary changes
may undermine existing oversight regimes, fuel conflicts of interest, create regulatory
blind-spots and so generate opportunities for malpractice and other types of wrongdoing
(Muzio et al., 2016).
Moreover, the ecological perspective outlined above cannot confine itself to competing
professional arrangements but must be cast wide enough to encompass government
pronouncements, legislative actions and regulatory shifts. Interactions between these may
produce unexpected tensions and contradictions. For example, the recent case of a
Dr Bawa-Garba who was investigated after the death of a child under her care highlights
some of these. This case was first taken through the courts (where Dr Bawa-Garba was
convicted of manslaughter through gross negligence), but when taken before the
professional regulation mechanisms of the GMC the doctor was merely suspended for
12 months, with the GMC arguing that “erasure [from The Medical Register] would
be disproportionate”. This decision was subsequently appealed to the high court. The
repercussions of this case demonstrate some of the tensions between legal and regulatory
remedies as well as with professional codes of practice and statutory duties such as the
newly introduced “duty of candour”. An ecological perspective must give wide enough
purview to capture such interactions.
But how can deleterious aspects of the “orchard”, “cellar” and “barrel(s)” be identified,
analysed and remedied? And how successful in doing so are the current arrangements for
looking at “the wider picture” surrounding high-profile cases of wrongdoing in
healthcare? In particular, have formal public inquiries into professional wrongdoing in the
NHS served us well to-date in providing clear sight of these ecological failings and their
possible remedy?
NHS Inquiries (rooting around in the cellar)
In the UK, formal public inquiries (either statutory or non-statutory) are a long-established
part of the institutional arrangements for relieving political pressure, restoring public
confidence and encouraging system reform. Inquiries typically involve “a retrospective
examination of events or circumstances […] to find out what happened, understand why,
and learn from the experiences of all those involved” (Walshe and Higgins, 2002, p. 851).
NHS-specific inquiries are usually initiated by the Secretary of State for Health, and even
then, often only after long and loud public concern evidenced through media pressure. Such
inquiries may have legal power to call witnesses and take expert testimony. The primary
output generated by an inquiry is its official report, and the most influential component of
that report is the set of recommendations detailing key learning points and desired future
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actions (Williams and Kevern, 2016). Relevant agencies, including government, statutory
bodies and both professional and lay associations, may then themselves make formal
representations in response.
In an analysis of NHS inquiries since 1967, Lehane (2015) identified three main reasons
for their enactment: in response to major failure or scandal; as proactive scrutiny of nascent
areas of concern; or as a means to assuage loss of public confidence (of course, two or more
of these may pertain). Similarly, Walshe (2003) identifies six purposes for formal inquiries: to
establish “the facts” around service failures and encourage learning from events; but also:
to promote cathartic change; provide reassurance; hold those responsible to account; and to
address the political aspects of the circumstances of the inquiry. The diversity of purposes
identified by these authors point to important tensions: the broader symbolic and ritualistic
tasks that inquiries perform may impede the more instrumental task of implementing
effective change in institutional arrangements, and this may be one reason why formal NHS
inquiries usually bring very little identifiable change (Timmins, 2013).
A textual analysis of recent NHS inquiries
While recognising the multiple, complex and often ambiguous nature of inquiry purposes,
we can nonetheless examine them for their degree of engagement with the surfacing and
addressing of professional wrongdoing. In particular, it may be helpful to examine the
implicit assumptions made about professionals, professional wrongdoing and professional
oversight, that are buried in the inquiries terms of reference, modes of practice, articulation
of events and recommendations. Thus, here we present the findings of an analysis of all the
major, formal NHS Inquiries into poor doctoring since 2000, dating back to the Bristol Royal
Infirmary (Kennedy, 2001) through Ayling (2004), Neale (2004), Kerr/Haslam (2005),
Shipman (2005), Francis (2010), Francis (2013) to the Francis (2015) “Freedom to Speak Up
Review”. The inquiry reports (and formal Government and other institutional responses)
were searched (electronically) through keywords such as “Whistle*” (raising) “Concern”,
“Speak*” ‘Bully*, “Victim*”, “Intimidat*”, “Reprisal”, “Silen*” and “Fear” (the asterisk (*)
represents “wildcard” letters, so that, for example, “Whistle*” would capture whistle-blower
and whistleblowing). The sections revealed by these searches (and surrounding paragraphs,
together with any signposted links) were then explored in more detail, building up a detailed
picture of how wrongdoing was identified and dealt with, alongside recommendations for
better handling of this in future.
A number of common issues arise from this textual analysis of the inquiries and
responses, and it is to these that we now turn. Table I highlights and summarises key
observations from each of the inquiries covered. Separate columns in this table identify the
nature of the individual wrongdoing (bad apple behaviour), any critique of the
organisational setting (bad barrel features) and wider criticism of the health system (bad
cellar). What follows below is a distillation of the key points arising from these inquiries in
relation to individual wrongdoing and the calling out of that.
System failures, rather than individual shortcomings
It was notable that most inquiry accounts focussed on the local organisational
arrangements and/or the broader system-level arrangements, rather than on the people
located at the sharp end of failure; that is, barrels and cellars generally received more
attention than bad apples, even when the inquiry was specifically focussed on the
wrongdoing of one or more individuals. In doing so, the inquiry reports routinely emphasise
structural and collective, rather than agency or individual, explanations (see Table I). One
exception to this was the Kerr/Haslam Report (2005), which highlighted whistleblowing in
the case of Kerr. As the counsel for the patients put it to the inquiry: “for the main part, we
do not say these are system failures, they are personality failures” (Vol 2: pp. 801-802).
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However, such pinning of responsibility for failure on individual actions or inactions was
very unusual in the inquiries reviewed, which very much offered up explanations based on
systemic failings, typically at an organisational level.
Cultural change over legal safeguards
Likely because of the emphasis on “system failings”, the most consistent remedy drawn out
from inquiry recommendations has been cultural reform and renewal rather than legal
safeguards or deeper rethinking about the safeguarding role of the professions. In focussing
on problematic cultures in this way, inquiries can be seen to “distribute a collective
responsibility for healthcare failures” (Goodwin, 2018).
Inquiries since Kennedy (2001) have consistently argued in favour of “culture change”
(without specifying in any detail how this was to be achieved, Davies and Mannion, 2013).
For example, Francis (2010) pointed to the problem of organisational culture, and considered
that “the most important factor in changing this will not be a new system or policy of
protection for whistle-blowers, but the fostering of a culture of openness, self-criticism and
teamwork”. Without a positive culture (it was claimed), it would never be easy to raise
concerns: Francis considered that whistleblowing was only necessary because of the
absence of systems and a culture accepted by all staff that is receptive to internal reporting
of concerns. “Therefore, the solution lies in creating the right culture, not in focussing on
improvements to whistleblowing legislation, important though such protection is” (p. 242).
Similar points are made by the government in response: while progress on Francis’ 290
recommendations was said to be necessary, “perhaps the most important point is […] the
ongoing need to change the culture in the NHS to one of patient-centred, continual
improvement in care and safety”. That cultural change is as unproblematic as such
pronouncements seem to suppose has, however, received some considerable challenge
(Davies and Mannion, 2013).
Raising concerns, blowing the whistle
The inquiries reviewed did not generally concern themselves with successful day-to-day
error spotting and correction within organisations; they were more concerned to identify
“failures to act” that led to on-going failings and wrongdoing, and with the wider system
failures that saw warnings, including whistleblowing, go unheeded. However, few
inquiries tried to define the concept; and indeed, the Shipman Inquiry tried to avoid using
the expression “whistleblowing” at all (2005, p. 319). Francis (2015) considered replacing
the term, before presenting a broad definition: as “a person who raises concerns in the
public interest”. Yet many persons who raise concerns do not necessarily, at the time of
raising the concerns, see themselves as whistleblowers. They are likely to come to regard
themselves as whistleblowers only if they suffer detriment as a result of raising the
concerns or if no action is taken on their concerns (p. 2). The Shipman Inquiry considered
that none of those persons who raised concerns were “whistleblowers” per se, as they did
not work within the same organisation as Shipman, (p. 318). Similarly, The Bristol
Inquiry did not appear to recognise the anaesthetist who raised concerns as a
whistleblower, stating that had the Public Interest Disclosure Act been in force it would
not have applied (2001, p. 160).
That there should be so much uncertainty and disquiet about speaking out should not
come as a surprise. Local discursive practices (e.g. on the nature of success, failure, risk and
performance) and local operational contingencies (such as resource constraints, service
rivalries, and stakeholder pressure) will have a powerful influence on the willingness of
employees to raise concerns and the ability and willingness of employers to respond
appropriately. However, the chair of the Shipman Inquiry, Janet Smith, stated that “I believe
that the willingness of one healthcare professional to take responsibility for raising concerns
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about the conduct, performance or health of another could make a greater potential
contribution to patient safety than any other single factor” (2005, p. 23) (subsequently cited
in Hooper, 2015, p. 2 and Francis, 2015). Similarly, as Niall Dickson, CEO of the GMC put it in
2012: “The eyes and ears of health professionals are often the most valuable means of
protecting patients and ensuring high quality care” (in Hooper, 2015, p. 20). Yet of some 820
recommendations across all of the inquiries reviewed we found only eight that were directly
concerned with whistleblowing; and even in the Shipman Inquiry, which stressed the role of
health professionals in raising concerns, we found only three of its 190 recommendations
focussed on whistleblowing.
Misplaced optimism
Evident from these inquiry reports is a high degree of re-inventing the wheel (Powell and
Mannion, 2016). The clearest example of this is the repeated identification of culture as both
culprit and solution to periodic failings in the quality of care in the NHS (discussed above).
A further example is the term “duty of candour” (i.e. a requirement, either in terms of
professional codes or even in statute, for professionals to speak out when they notice failure
or wrongdoing), which appeared in Kennedy (2001) through Kerr/Haslam (2005) to Francis
(2013), Dalton and Williams (2014) and DH. Similarly, there has been a repeated stress on re-
issuing policies and guidelines, despite scant evidence that these have much effect
(Shipman, 2005; Kerr/Haslam, 2005). Indeed, Francis (2013, p. 280) noted that the Mid
Staffordshire Trust had actually had a policy on whistleblowing since 2001, but events
exposed the “hollowness” of that policy.
Overall, many of the reports appear to be somewhat optimistic that “things are getting
better”: that institutions, policies and procedures are in place that will not allow earlier
problems to reoccur (e.g. Ayling inquiry; Shipman inquiry). Governments tend to argue
that “much has changed” since the incidents took place, and that remedial policies have
been put into place. Not all commentators would agree, however, and the treatment of
whistle-blowers in particular remains highly controversial, even from within Parliament
(O’Dowd, 2015). Thus, while there have been some positive changes, there must be a
concern that the changes seen are not sufficiently comprehensive enough, or dynamic
enough, to repair the weaknesses of professional regulatory control. Indeed, the
impression gained across these inquiries is one of missed opportunities and failed
learning: the word “hindsight” was used 456 times in the testimony to the Francis public
inquiry. In terms of whistleblowing, speaking up, and addressing professional
wrongdoing, the NHS appears to have much to learn before becoming a learning
organisation (Davies and Nutley, 2000; Harvey et al., 2015). Moreover, the regulatory
control of the medical profession cannot yet be said to be fully functional, with reform
through inquiries having been scant.
Concluding remarks
Our theoretical and empirical analysis has several implications for understanding and
addressing professional failures as well as for dealing with weaknesses in professional
regulatory systems. First, seeking out “bad apples” is core work for the professions if their
claims to self-regulation are to be taken seriously – so surfacing and dealing with “bad
apple” doctors is paramount. When the discourse promulgated through inquiries
backgrounds “individual blame” just as it foregrounds “systems failure”, something has
been lost. The move to emphasise “just cultures” (where the need for learning from an
open assessment of errors is balanced with the need to hold individuals to account
for those errors) is a reflection of a need for rebalancing being taken up by other
parts of the ecology. Thus, while there is an important role in preventing, and addressing
culpable failures at the local level, there is also a need to develop accountability
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systems that reflect the dynamic and recursive nature of the duality of structure
and agency in shaping and driving professional behaviour in healthcare settings
(Aveling et al., 2016).
Second, we can also consider ( from the power perspective on professions) that the
intrinsic self-serving nature of the professions is always going to make such a “bad apple”
approach insufficient. We can therefore consider that the profession itself may be a “bad
barrel” (lurking in a poorly lit part of the “cellar”), and we may need to respond accordingly.
In this regard, recent reforms of the self-regulatory process such as the increase in lay
oversight, and creeping rationalisation and standardisation have served to dilute
professional control and circumscribe professional autonomy and behaviour: yet
professional autonomy and dominance may be reasserted in other ways through various
restratification processes involving doctors laying claim to management and oversight
functions. In this way, the profession is not merely reacting to external events but also
attempting to control the direction of change and actively shape the policy and
implementation agenda. But whether these institutional changes, taken together, have
attenuated (or exacerbated) the potential for professional wrongdoing in the NHS (and the
ability of the profession to police miscreants) is unclear.
Third, there is an implicit assumption in professionalism that individuals are “knights
not knaves” (LeGrand, 2003). But we can ask: how does the profession find those who have
knavish tendencies, and perhaps as important, how do the professional arrangements of
selection, education, training, licencing, validation, etc., along with softer systems of
socialisation, provide encouragement for continuing “knightish” behaviours? Does the
barrel protect or spoil the apples contained? Indeed, we may ask: what is the role of the
profession in growing robust “apples” in the first place (seeing the medical profession then
as both orchard and barrel). Moreover, the “evolving ecology” view suggest that overall
systemic arrangements may not necessarily be optimum (the “bad cellar” analogy): there are
new competing (market, bureaucratic and professional) logics that vie for professional
attention and shape behaviour; there are boundary disputes between professionally led
structures and other agencies, with scope for gaps, conflict and overlaps; and the medical
profession has other “projects” beyond safeguarding from wrongdoing (indeed, sometimes
in conflict with this goal).
Finally, formal Inquiries have to-date failed to get to grips with this new ecology and
the ramifications in any meaningful way: their focus on organisations and systems in
inquiry procedures and recommendations, while helpful in some ways, has led to other
important areas being overlooked; the micro focus on bad apples similarly misses
important (profession-related) meso-level organisational dynamics (including
organisational strategies, structures, incentives and cultures) which shape professional
behaviours, for good or ill. Inquiries, then, can be seen as contributing to the proliferation
of accountabilities that has diluted the grip of self-regulation and contributed to the
individual-collective tension in delivering accountability (Goodwin, 2018), yet there remain
important deficits in our understanding about how the medical profession itself can
properly be held to account.
In sum, while we cannot eliminate misconduct, we can recognise that problems (and their
solutions) can arise at four levels (apple, barrel, cellar and orchard). Professional misconduct
has a greater chance of occurring when there are design faults and operational failings at
each of these levels. Moreover, the widest examination of professional failings (i.e. public
inquiries), at least as presently constituted, are a weak and expensive institutional
instrument for addressing failures of the regulatory apparatus. Their enduring appeal may
be more symbolic than instrumental in that they allow space for public catharsis and help
maintain political legitimacy for the NHS, while leaving untroubled professionally led and
professionally dominated regulatory arrangements.
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